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Abstract:	Firm	corporate	governance	issues	in	China	have	been	extensively	studied	since	the	early	1990s	
while	corporate	governance	issues	in	Chinese	banks	have	been	ignored.		To	assist	in	filling	in	this	gap,	by	
using	the	corporate	governance	conceptual	framework	of	firms,	this	paper	carefully	examines	the	govern-
ance	problems	that	continue	to	plague	the	Chinese	banking	sector	and	then	argues	that	state	ownership	or	
state	concentrated	ownership	of	Chinese	banks	may	be	the	primary	factor	contributing	to	ineffective	cor-
porate	governance	in	the	Chinese	banking	sector.		In	order	to	solve	ineffective	governance	problems	in	the	
Chinese	banking	sector,	privatization	may	eventually	be	necessary.
introduction
Corporate	governance	issues	have	been	extensively	studied	in	China	since	the	early	1990s,	when	the	
corporate	governance	concept	was	first	introduced	from	the	West.		However,	the	literature	has	tended	to	
focus	on	the	corporate	governance	issue	of	state-owned	enterprises	(e.g.,	Wu,	1994;	Zhang,	1997;	Lin,	C.,	
2001;	Tenev	et	al.,	2002;	Tian	&	Estrin,	2005;	Xu	et	al.,	2005)	while	ignoring	that	of	the	Chinese	banks.		The	
present	research	assists	in	filling	in	this	gap.		Using	the	corporate	governance	conceptual	framework	of	
firms,	the	governance	problems	that	continue	to	plague	the	Chinese	banking	sector	(especially	the	state-
owned	commercial	banks)	are	carefully	examined.		Based	on	the	theoretical	discussion	of	the	corporate	
governance	issues	of	Chinese	banks	(especially	those	relevant	to	the	state-owned	commercial	banks),	this	
research	argues	that	state	ownership	or	state	concentrated	ownership	of	Chinese	banks	may	be	the	pri-
mary	factor	contributing	to	ineffective	corporate	governance	in	the	Chinese	banking	sector.		In	order	to	
reduce	political	and	agency	costs,	and	solve	the	insider	control	problem	facing	the	state-owned	commer-
cial	banks,	privatization	may	eventually	be	necessary	for	the	establishment	of	effective	Chinese	banking	
corporate	governance	with	the	market	supporting	institutions,	such	as	the	rule	of	law.	
literAture reVieW
The	corporate	governance	literature	is	replete	with	studies	involving	firms	in	the	non-financial	sector.	
In	contrast,	the	issue	of	banking	corporate	governance	appears	to	be	under-researched.		Even	in	devel-
oped	economies,	researchers	have	only	recently	turned	their	attention	towards	the	bank	governance	is-
sues	 (e.g.,	Denis	&	McConnell,	 2003;	Levine,	2003;	Macey	&	O’Hara,	2003;	Caprio	et	al.,	 2004;	Arun	&	
Turner,	2004).
The	concept	of	corporate	governance	was	first	introduced	to	China	from	the	West	in	1993,	and	since	
1999,	the	concept	has	been	officially	cited	in	major	Chinese	government	documents	and	by	government	
agencies	(e.g.,	Zhou,	2004;	Zhang,	2004).	The	China	Securities	Regulatory	Commission	(CSRC)	and	China	
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Banking	Regulatory	Commission	(CBRC)	have	even	gone	so	far	as	to	issue	guidelines	on	corporate	govern-
ance	regarding	both	firms	and	banks	(Shi	&	Weisert,	2002).		The	academic	study	of	corporate	governance	
issues	related	to	Chinese	state-owned	enterprises	has	been	growing	very	rapidly	in	recent	years	(e.g.,	Wu,	
1994;	Zhang,	1997;	Ferri,	2003;	Tenev	et	al.,	2002;	Clarke,	2003;	Tian	&	Estrin,	2005;	Xu	et	al.,	2005),	 in	
contrast,	very	few	studies	have	been	done	on	the	corporate	governance	and	ownership	issues	of	Chinese	
banks.		This	paper	attempts	to	help	fill	this	gap.		Utilizing	corporate	governance	concepts,	this	paper	
analyzes	the	corporate	governance	and	related	ownership	issues	of	the	Chinese	banks,	especially	those	of	
China’s	big	four	state	commercial	banks.	
This	paper	is	organized	in	the	following	manner.		Section	two	briefly	introduces	the	general	concepts	
and	issues	of	corporate	governance.		Section	three	discusses	governance	and	ownership	issues	facing	the	
Chinese	banking	sector	in	the	context	of	ongoing	banking	reform.		The	last	section	provides	some	policy	
implications	and	ends	with	conclusions.	
corporAte goVernAnce: conceptuAl frAMeWork
Generally,	there	are	two	major	definitions	of	corporate	governance	in	the	academic	field.		In	a	narrow	
sense,	corporate	governance	 is	considered	as	the	mechanism	through	which	shareholders	are	assured	
that	managers	will	act	in	their	best	interest	(Levine,	2003;	Arun	&	Turner,	2004).		In	a	broad	view,	corpo-
rate	governance	 is	viewed	as	the	mechanisms	by	which	financial	suppliers	control	managers	so	as	to	
ensure	their	capital	cannot	be	expropriated	and	that	they	maximize	investment	return	(e.	g.,	Shleifer	&	
Vishny,	1997;	Oman,	2001).	
Regardless	of	how	corporate	governance	is	defined,	there	are	two	major	issues	that	concern	it:	the	
agency	problem	and	insider	control	problem.		First,	the	agency	problem	is	possibly	the	central	element	
of	corporate	governance	(e.g.,	OECD,	2004).		It	concerns	the	unwillingness	of	some	firm	mangers	to	con-
sistently	act	in	the	stockholders’	best	interests.		It	is	believed	that	it	results	from	the	separation	of	owner-
ship	and	control	whereby	the	managers	operate	the	firm	in	terms	of	their	interests,	not	those	of	share-
holders	 (Jensen	&	Meckling,	1976;	Fama	&	Jensen,	1983;	Henderson,	1986).	 	The	agency	problem	also	
presents	managers	with	opportunities	to	build	their	own	empires	while	neglecting	shareholder	responsi-
bilities	 (Levine,	2003).	 	In	order	to	solve	the	agency	problem,	 it	has	been	argued	that	product	market	
competition	(including	takeovers)	force	firm	managers	to	listen	to	shareholders	who	pressure	them	to	act	
with	self	discipline	(e.g.,	Alchian,	1950;	Jensen,	1988;	Kose	&	Simi,	2000).		However,	Shleifer	and	Vishny	
(1997)	argue	that	product	market	competition	is	probably	the	most	powerful	force	driving	economic	effi-
ciency	in	the	world.		However,	they	doubt	 it	alone	is	not	sufficient	to	solve	the	corporate	governance	
problems.		To	solve	the	agency	problem	caused	by	management	control,	Jensen	(1993)	suggests	that	it	
may	be	necessary	to	strengthen	corporate	governance	internally,	especially	by	enhancing	the	roles	of	
both	directorial	boards	and	large	shareholders	involved	in	the	corporate	governance.	
The	insider	control	problem	may	also	arise	from	the	power	of	certain	controlling	shareholders	over	
minority	shareholders	due	to	information	asymmetries,	the	costly	process	of	monitoring	and	a	weak	legal	
system	(e.g.,	OECD,	2004).		Controlling	shareholders	may	influence	management	for	their	own	benefits	at	
the	expense	of	small	investors’	interests	(Gillan	&	Starks,	2003).		If	the	interests	of	small	investors	are	not	
properly	protected	by	the	legal	system,	they	might	lose	confidence	and	incentives	to	make	investments,	
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resulting	in	a	hindering	of	the	capital	market	development.		In	order	to	solve	the	insider	control	problem,	
some	(e.g.,	OECD,	2004)	argue	that	it	is	necessary	to	increase	the	role	of	market	competition	as	well	as	
the	legal	system	in	order	to	protect	the	minority	investors’	interests	equitably.	
the goVernAnce issues of the chinese BAnking 
With	the	Chinese	banking	sector	being	increasingly	liberalized	in	the	past	twenty	years,	bank	manag-
ers	in	the	Chinese	banks	have	gradually	gained	more	control	rights	over	their	business	decisions	(Zhang,	
2000).		The	governance	structure	has	been	changing	as	the	Chinese	banks	(e.g.,	BOC,	CCB	and	regional	
commercial	banks)	are	now	encouraged	to	adopt	a	shareholding	ownership	structure.		The	governance	
issues	and	related	ownership	problem	in	the	Chinese	domestic	banks	have	become	more	obvious	than	
before.	
political control and Agency problems
Prior	to	the	initiation	of	economic	reform	in	the	early	1980s,	the	Chinese	banks	were	fully	controlled	
by	the	state,	which	exercised	control	rights	over	all	decisions	ranging	from	operations	to	personnel	(e.g.,	
Zhang,	1998;	Qian,	2001).		On	the	one	hand,	this	complete	state	involvement	in	the	banking	activities	con-
tributed	to	a	lack	of	managerial	incentives	(La	Porta	et	al.,	2002).		On	the	other	hand,	it	fostered	politically-
motivated	or	misinformed	business	decisions	(e.g.,	Sherif	et	al.,	2002;	Ferri,	2003;	Hamid,	2005).		As	a	result,	
lack	of	managerial	 incentives	and	full	political	controls	 (La	Porta	et	al.,	2002)	 in	the	pre-reform	period	
contributed	to	poor	performance	and	inefficiencies	in	the	Chinese	banking	sector.	
In	the	mid-1980s,	China	realized	that	the	managerial	incentive	problem	needed	to	be	addressed.		In	
order	to	increase	the	bank	managerial	incentives,	the	state	started	to	allow	bank	managers	more	rights	
regarding	business	operating	decisions	(Zhang,	2000).		This	managerial	right	has	produced	mixed	results.	
On	the	one	hand,	this	resulted	in	improved	business	decisions,	which	contributed	to	better	performance	
and	higher	levels	of	banking	efficiencies.		On	the	other	hand,	this	contributed	to	agency	problems.		More	
business	control	rights	meant	that	bank	managers	now	enjoyed	more	actual	authority.		As	mentioned	
before,	bank	managers	might	not	always	act	in	the	bank’s	best	interest,	thus	they	might	be	strongly	mo-
tivated	to	use	their	newly	acquired	power	to	serve	their	private	interests.		This	actually	occurred	with	
Chinese	banks	during	the	reform	period.	 	The	related	agency	problems	such	as	corruption,	misuse	of	
power,	and	stripping	of	state	bank’s	assets	for	private	interest	or	benefits	occasionally	occurred	in	China	
(e.g.,	Tian	&	Estrin,	2005).		Why	has	the	Chinese	state,	which	is	the	sole	owner	with	the	most	controlling	
power	over	the	Chinese	banks,	been	so	apparently	challenged	in	effectively	monitoring	bank	managers?		
Researchers	(e.g.,	Qian,	2001;	Tian	&	Estrin,	2005;	Xu	et	al.,	2005)	have	argued	that	information	asym-
metry	contributes	to	the	Chinese	political	bureaucrats’	 inability	to	effectively	monitor	bank	managers.	
Because	those	political	bureaucrats	lack	direct	involvement	in	banking	operation,	they	tend	to	not	be	suf-
ficiently	well-informed	to	assess	the	effectiveness	of	bank	managers’	actions.		As	the	sole	shareholder,	the	
Chinese	government	is	especially	challenged	in	monitoring	the	bank	managers	in	that	nation.		Estrin	and	
Perotin	(1991)	argue	that	the	non-economic	agenda	of	political	bureaucrats	contributes	to	their	ineffective-
ness	at	monitoring	bank	managers,	because	their	political	agenda	tends	to	be	contradictory	to	the	eco-
nomic	agenda	of	bank	profitability	and	efficiency.	 	Moreover,	 they	argue	that	 the	mixing	of	economic	
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(commercial	lending)	and	non-economic	agendas	(policy	lending)	in	the	Chinese	banking	sector	during	the	
reform	period	has	complicated	the	bureaucrats’	monitoring	of	bank	managers.		It	increased	the	bureau-
crats’	difficulty	in	assessing	bank	managers’	performance	as	bank	managers	are	able	to	attribute	their	
poor	performance	or	bank	failures	to	political	influence	(e.g.,	policy	lending)	or	political	interventions.		As	
a	result,	government	bureaucrats	are	discouraged	from	placing	harden	budget	constraints	on	bank	man-
agers.	
When	the	banks	face	dire	circumstances,	the	state	has	to	come	to	their	rescue.		Large	amounts	of	
public	funds	were	funneled	into	the	Chinese	four	state	commercial	banks	between	1998	and	2003	(Tang,	
2005),	providing	evidence	that	the	state	banking	sector	continues	to	face	the	soft-budget	constraint	prob-
lem.	
Ambiguous	property	rights	of	Chinese	banks	also	may	contribute	to	the	inability	of	political	bureau-
crats	to	effectively	monitor	bank	managers	(Zhang,	1997).		Chinese	banks	belong	to	the	state,	which	in	
China	means	banks	are	owned	by	the	whole	of	the	people,	but	no	one	person.		Political	bureaucrats	rep-
resent	the	state,	but	are	not	the	owners	of	the	state	banks.		In	a	legal	sense,	they	do	not	possess	residual	
claimant	rights.		Hence,	political	bureaucrats	may	lack	incentives	to	appoint	competent	managers	when	
they	select	them,	and	they	might	also	lack	incentives	to	monitor	bank	managers	(Zhang,	1999).	
table 1: Assets and liabilities of the Banking institutions in china as of december 31, 2003
Financial	Institutions Assets
(100million	RMB)
Share Liabilities
(100million	RMB)
Share
All	Banking		institutions 276394.5 100.0 265741.0 100.0
Policy	banks 21247.0 7.7 20290.5 7.6
SOCBs 151940.6 55.0 145762.0 54.9
JSCBs 38169.7 13.8 36831.0 13.9
City	commercial	banks 14621.7 5.3 14122.5 5.3
Rural	commercial	banks 384.8 0.1 380.1 0.1
UCCs 1468.3 0.5 1464.3 0.6
RCCs 26509.2 9.6 26646.2 10.0
NBFIs 9100.0 3.3 7682.6 2.9
Postal	Savings 8984.4 3.3 8984.4 3.4
Foreign-funded	FIs 3969.0 1.4 3577.3 1.3
Source:	The	China	Banking	Regulation	Commission	website:	http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/index.htm.
Note:	The	banking	institutions	include	policy	banks,	state-owned	commercial	banks	(SOCBs),	joint	stock	commercial	banks	(JSCBs),	
city	commercial	banks,	rural	commercial	banks,	urban	credit	cooperatives	(UCCs),	rural	credit	cooperatives	(RCCs),	non-bank	fi-
nancial	institutions	(NBFIs),	postal	savings	institutions	and	foreign-funded	financial	institutions.	
As	mentioned	above,	due	to	an	ineffective	monitoring	mechanism	in	the	Chinese	banking	system,	
bank	managers	do	not	act	always	in	the	best	interests	of	the	state.		Thus,	the	agency	problem	and	re-
lated	political	control	problems	arose	during	the	reform	period.		The	dilemma	of	Chinese	banking	sector	
over	the	past	two	decades	is	that	either	the	bank	managers	complain	of	a	lack	of	autonomy	or	the	state,	
as	an	owner,	loses	control	and	suffers	from	lack	of	bank	management	accountability.		In	order	to	solve	the	
agency	problem	and	political	control	 in	 the	Chinese	banks,	 the	Chinese	banking	sector	reform	should	
perhaps	address	the	most	fundament	issue:	the	state	ownership	that	caused	the	agency	problem.		Thus,	
the	ownership	reform	(privatization	of	the	banking	sector)	perhaps	is	the	key	to	establishing	effective	
corporate	governance	in	the	Chinese	banking	sector.	
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state-owned or concentrated shareholders and insider control
The	other	major	governance	 issue	 facing	the	Chinese	banking	sector	 is	 insider	control	regarding	
state	ownership	and	state-concentrated	shareholders.		As	Table	1	indicates,	the	majority	of	Chinese	banks	
are	either	wholly	owned	by	the	state	or	at	least	have	state	concentrated	ownership.		In	other	words,	the	
state	is	either	the	sole	owner	of	Chinese	banks	or	the	sole	largest	shareholder	of	the	Chinese	banks.		Be-
cause	of	large	investment	and	information	asymmetry,	the	Chinese	state	has	more	incentives	and	ability	
to	acquire	information	and	monitor	managers	than	small	shareholders.		Thus,	state	ownership	or	concen-
trated	ownership	can	monitor	managers,	reducing	the	managerial	agency	costs	in	the	short	run	(e.g.,	Qian,	
1995;	Orman,	2001;	Levine,	2003).		During	the	reform	period,	the	Chinese	government	removed	many	high-
ranking	bank	managers	for	abusing	their	power	for	their	personal	interest	or	benefit	(Guo,	2003).	How-
ever,	as	discussed	above,	in	the	long	run,	the	agency	problems	occasionally	occurred	due	to	ineffectively	
monitoring	by	political	bureaucrats	in	the	Chinese	banking	sector.	
Additionally,	this	full	state	or	concentrated	ownership	may	contribute	to	the	other	governance	prob-
lem,	insider	control.		Due	to	the	Chinese	government’s	large	bank	investments,	its	benefits	can	be	maxi-
mized	through	its	control	rights	over	management	at	the	expense	of	small	shareholders’	interest.		This	
potentially	may	lead	to	hindering	the	financial	market	development	in	China.		As	the	government	contin-
ues	to	hold	a	controlling	share,	it	will	clearly	be	able	to	continue	to	influence	bank	management	decisions	
through	directorial	and	supervisory	board	participation.		For	example,	the	largest	shareholder	of	China	
Construction	Bank	(CCB)	is	the	SAFE	Investments	Ltd,	which	represents	Chinese	government	organiza-
tions	-	the	State	Administration	of	Foreign	Exchange	(SAFE),	the	Ministry	of	Finance	(MOF)	and	the	
People’s	Bank	of	China	(PBC).		As	it	is	shown	in	Table	2,	it	holds	a	controlling	share	of	the	CCB	(76	per-
cent)	even	after	the	Bank	of	America	purchased	a	nine	percent	share	of	the	Bank.		Under	this	new	gov-
ernance	structure,	the	Chinese	government	will	be	able	to	play	a	dominant	role	through	the	SAFE	Invest-
ment	Ltd.		This	new	arrangement	at	the	CCB,	with	the	state	holding	a	controlling	share,	will	be	challenged	
in	solving	not	only	the	agency	problems,	but	also	conflicts	of	interest	between	the	Chinese	state	(largest	
shareholder)	and	small	shareholders.	
To	sum	up,	from	the	corporate	governance	perspective,	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	Chinese	banking	
table 2: shareholders of china construction Bank corporation (by June, 2005)
Shareholder Ownership Capital	Contributions
(RMB	’000)
Proportion
(percent)
China	SAFE	Investments	Limited Wholly	Government-Owned		 165,538,000	 85.228
China	Jianyin	Investment	Limited Wholly	Government-Owned				 20,692,250 10.653
State	Grid	Corporation	of	China Wholly	Government-Owned		 3,000,000 1.545
Shanghai	Baosteel	Group	 Wholly	Government-Owned		 3,000,000 1.545
China	Yangtze	Power	Co.,	Ltd. Joint-stock	company		 2,000,000 1.030
Total 194,230,250 100
Bank	of	America Foreign	 US$	2.5	billion 9
Source:	Compiled	by	the	author	from	China	Construction	Bank	Corporation	Annual	Report	(2004),	and	the	report	from	People’s 
Daily	(June	17,	2005,	p.	A3).	
Note	1:	According	to	an	agreement	signed	by	Bank	of	America	and	China	Construction	Bank			Corporation,	Bank	of	America	pur-
chased	US$	2.5	billion	buying	stakes	from	the	largest	shareholder	of	CCB,	China	SAFE	Investments	Ltd.,	and	will	purchase	US$	
500	million	of	shares	later	2005	in	CCB’s	IPO.	It	also	had	an	option	to	buy	additional	shares	in	the	future	to	increase	its	ownership	
in	CCB	to	19.9	percent.	
Note	2:	China	Yangtze	Power	Co.,	Ltd.	is	a	joint-stock	company,	however,	it	is	owned	by	Three	Gorges	Project	Corporation	with	5	
other	entities:	Huaneng	Power	International,	 Inc.;	China	National	Nuclear	Corporation;	China	National	Petroleum	Corporation;	
China	 Gezhouba	 Water	 Resources	 and	 Hydropower	 Engineering	 Group	 Co.,	 Ltd.;	 Changjiang	 Water	 Resource	 Commission’s	
Changjiang	Institute	of	Survey,	Planning,	Design	and	Research,	all	of	which	are	state-owned	enterprises.
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sector	is	challenged	by	agency	problems	and	insider	control	issues,	and	that	both	of	these	concern	Chinese	
state	ownership	or	state-concentrated	ownership.		Thus,	in	order	to	improve	the	bank	governance	struc-
ture	in	China,	the	first	step	the	government	should	consider	taking	is	to	change	the	Chinese	state	owner-
ship.		In	other	words,	relinquishing	state	ownership	of	banks	to	the	private	sectors	will	likely	be	an	option	
worthy	of	consideration.
policy discussions
reshaping the ownership structure in the chinese Banking sector
As	discussed	above,	the	full	or	concentrated	state	ownership	of	the	banking	sector	is	perhaps	one	of	
the	major	causes	of	poor	governance	structure	in	the	Chinese	banking	sector.		With	the	deepening	of	the	
economic	reform	and	further	opening	of	the	Chinese	economy,	the	ownership	reform	has	become	one	of	
the	most	important	elements	in	the	establishment	of	effective	corporate	governance	in	the	Chinese	SOEs	
and	the	banking	sector.	
So	far,	diversification	of	ownership	seems	to	be	an	effective	way	of	improving	the	governance	struc-
ture	of	the	Chinese	state-owned	or	state-dominated	banks.		With	more	private	investors	(e.g.,	domestic	
and	foreign	strategic	investors)	getting	involved	in	purchasing	shares	Chinese	domestic	bank	shares,	the	
better	the	governance	structure	will	likely	become	(Gillan	&	Starke,	2003).		This	is	because	those	inves-
tors’	involvement	will	not	only	help	improve	the	governance	structure	of	the	Chinese	banks	by	introduc-
ing	their	advanced	management	expertise	and	advanced	management	philosophy,	but	also	by	creating	a	
competitive	market	for	the	Chinese	domestic	banks.		In	order	to	survive	in	a	more	competitive	banking	
market,	the	Chinese	bank	managers	will	be	required	to	serve	the	best	interests	of	their	shareholders.	
Otherwise,	they	might	be	threatened	to	be	fired.	In	this	sense,	diversification	of	the	ownership	structure,	
to	some	extent,	will	likely	have	a	positive	effect	on	the	agency	problem	(e.g.,	abuse	of	managerial	power,	
corruption,	etc).		With	the	government	relinquishing	its	ownership	or	controlling	shares	of	the	Chinese	
domestic	banks,	the	competitive	market	will	likely	become	influential	in	pressuring	the		Chinese	domestic	
bank	managers	to	best	serve	their	shareholders’	interests,	thus,	the	profitability	and	efficiency	of	the	Chi-
nese	banks	will	likely	increase	as	a	result.
Recent	reforms	in	the	Chinese	banking	sector	appear	to	be	on	the	right	track.		The Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance Reforms and Supervision of Bank of China and China Construction Bank,	issued	by	
the	CRBC	in	March,	2004	(CRBC	website,	2005),	clearly	encourages	state	banks	to	introduce	domestic	and	
foreign	strategic	investors	in	an	effort	to	diversify	their	ownership	structure	in	the	future.		The	CBRC	
even	raised	the	maximum	equity	share	held	by	a	single	foreign	investor	in	a	Chinese	financial	institution	
from	15	to	20	percent.		As	Table	3	shows,	foreign	banks	are	increasingly	becoming	shareholders	in	the	
Chinese	domestic	banks,	with	some	becoming	the	second	largest	shareholders	in	certain	Chinese	domestic	
banks	(e.g.,	HSBC	in	the	Bank	of	Communications,	19.9	percent;	New	Bridge	Capital	Group	in	Shenzhen	
Development	Bank,	17.89	percent;	Standard	Chartered	in	Bohai	Bank,	19.9	percent).		The	HSBC,	as	the	
second	largest	shareholder	of	the	Bank	of	Communications,	now	sits	in	both	the	directorial	board	and	
executive	management	of	the	Bank	of	Communications.	
It	appears	unlikely	that	the	Chinese	government	will	relinquish	its	controlling	share	in	the	Chinese	
domestic	banks	in	the	near	or	intermediate	term.		In	the	long	run,	with	the	market	institutional	buildup,	
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it	seems	natural	for	the	Chinese	government	to	eventually	disengage	from	involvement	in	economic	ac-
tivities	such	as	the	banking	business.	
Market discipline on the governance Behavior
Publicly	listing	is	also	an	effective	way	to	force	the	banks	to	improve	their	governance	structure.		By	
publicly	offering	shares,	the	Chinese	domestic	banks	may	be	able	to	expand	their	capital	base	and	enhance	
their	equity	structure	and	transparency	for	public	oversight.		After	public	offerings,	the	Chinese	domestic	
banks	will	be	required	to	attain	standards	of	information	disclosure	as	listed	companies,	and	be	monitored	
by	shareholders,	regulatory	authorities,	the	general	public	and	other	related	parties.		They	will	also	be	
forced	to	listen	to	the	shareholders’	voices,	concerning	the	interests	of	shareholders.
table 3: foreign ownership in china’s local Banks
Chinese Domestic Banks Foreign Financial Institutions Month
/Year
Million
US $
Share
Industrial	 and	Commercial	Bank	
of	China
Bank	of	China
China	Construction	Bank
Jinan	City	Commercial	Bank
Bohai	Bank
Shenzhen	Development	Bank
Bank	of	Communications
Fujian	Asian	Bank
Fujian	Industrial	Bank
China	Minsheng	Banking	
Corp.
Nanchong	Commercial	Bank	
Pudong	Development	Bank
Xi’an	City	Commercial	Bank
Nanjing	City	Commercial	Bank
Bank	of	Shanghai
Dalian	City	Commercial	Bank
China	Everbright	Bank
Goldman	Sachs	Group	Inc.
American	Express	Co.
Allianz	AG
Asian	Development	Bank
USB	AG
Asian	Financial	Holdings	Pte.	Ltd.
RBS	China	Investments	SARL
Bank	of	America
Temasek
Commonwealth	Bank	of	Australia
Standard	Chartered
New	Bridge	Capital	Group
HSBC
HSBC	
Hang	Seng	Bank	(HSBC	Group)
Singapore	Government	Investment	Corp.
International	Finance	Corp.
International	Finance	Corp.
German	 Development	 Finance	 Group	
DEG
Citibank	
International	Finance	Corp.
Canada’s	Nova	Scotia	Bank
International	Finance	Corp.
HSBC
International	Finance	Group
Shanghai	Commercial	Bank
SHK	Financial	Group	
China	Everbright	Holding	Co.	Ltd	(HK)
Asian	Development	Bank
01/2006
01/2006
01/2006
03/2006
03/2006												
03/2006					
03/2006								
06/2005
09/2005
11/2004
11/2004
10/2004
08/2004
12/2003
12/2003
12/2003
12/2003
11/2003
01/2003
11/2003
09/2002
09/2002
11/2001
12/2001
1999/2001
12/2001
NA
1997
1996
258
28.0
92.0
NA
NA
NA
NA
250
150
120
175
150
175
20
207.95
NA
NA
23.5
NA
72
NA
NA
27
62.6
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
7.00
1.00
2.00
0.23
1.55
4.80
9.61
9.00
5.10
11.00
19.90
17.89
19.90
27.00
15.89
5.00
4.00
1.22
NA
4.62
12.4
11.5
15.00
8.00
7.00
3.00
10.00
20.07
3.03
Source:	US-China Business Review	(2003,	2004),	Tokyo Mitsubishi Review	(2004),	the Wall Street Journal	(2003,	2005),	and	various	
reports	from	People’s Daily	and	China Daily;	Various	banks’	annual	reports	and	news	press.	
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Market	competition	is	a	driving	force	towards	efficiency	(Lin	&	Tan,	1999).		However,	it	cannot	by	
itself	solve	all	corporate	governance	problems	of	the	Chinese	domestic	banks.		Even	in	well-developed	
Western	markets	(e.g.,	the	United	States),	corporate	scandals	like	Enron,	Global	Crossing,	Worldcom	and	
Xerox	suggest	that	the	world	may	be	without	a	perfect	market.		Markets	may	fail,	requiring	repair	at	the	
time	of	such	failures.		Thus,	the	nurturance	of	a	well-functioning	market	in	China	requires	the	effective	
establishment	of	the	corresponding	systems	and	institutions	of	 laws	and	rules.		For	that	to	occur,	the	
Chinese	government	would	and	must	play	a	crucial	role	even	if	that	required	it	to	cease	playing	its	own-
ership	and/or	control	role	in	the	Chinese	banking	market.
the role of government: regulator and rule setter
As	argued	above,	the	state	ownership	is	the	major	cause	for	the	poor	Chinese	bank	governance.		In	
order	to	build	effective	governance	structure	in	the	Chinese	banking	sector,	it	will	eventually	be	natural	
for	the	Chinese	government	to	disengage	itself	from	the	banking	business.	
Compared	with	non-financial	firms,	banks	are	generally	more	opaque	(Levine,	2003),	thus	information	
asymmetries	are	larger	with	banks	(Furfine,	2001;	Levine,	2003;	Arun	&	Turner,	2004).		Information	asym-
metries	increase	the	difficulty	for	shareholders	to	effectively	monitor	bank	managers.		Thus,	the	opaque-
ness	of	the	banking	industry	requires	regulation.		To	encourage	the	effective	monitoring	of	bank	manage-
ment	by	non-state	investors,	the	Chinese	government	can	play	an	important	role	as	a	regulator	and	a	rule	
setter	in	the	banking	market.		As	a	rule	setter	and	regulator,	the	Chinese	government	needs	to	make	
available	a	legal	and	regulatory	framework	demanding	the	adoption	of	international	accounting	standards	
by	bank	managers	as	well	as	requiring	the	revelation	of	appropriate	information	that	allows	for	efficient	
monitoring	of	bank	management	by	private	investors.		In	this	way,	the	Chinese	government	still	continues	
to	play	its	important	role	in	the	banking	industry.	
conclusions
Based	on	theoretical	discussions	of	the	governance	issues	of	Chinese	banks,	this	paper	argues	that	
state	ownership	or	state	concentrated	ownership	of	Chinese	banks	is	a	fundamental	factor	contributing	
to	ineffective	governance	in	the	Chinese	banking	sector.		In	order	to	reduce	political	and	agency	costs,	and	
solve	the	insider	control	problem	facing	the	Chinese	state	banks,	privatization	may	eventually	be	neces-
sary	for	establishing	effective	Chinese	banking	governance	with	the	market	supporting	institutions,	such	
as	the	rule	of	law	being	well	established.		Towards	this	end,	the	current	reform	approach	(i.e.,	adopting	
the	standard	corporate	governance	structure,	inviting	foreign	banks	to	hold	bank	shares,	listing	in	the	
international	stock	markets,	and	strengthening	the	banking	regulation	and	supervision)	seems	to	be	es-
sentially	headed	in	the	right	direction.		However,	to	assist	private	sectors	to	more	efficiently	monitor	bank	
managers,	the	government	should	consider	the	gradual	cessation	of	its	involvement	in	banking	activities,	
and	instead	engage	in	a	rule-setter	and	regulatory	role.		In	other	words,	it	is	recommended	in	this	paper	
that,	as	opposed	to	being	both	an	owner	and	a	player	in	the	banking	sector,	the	government	play	the	role	
of	a	fair	competition	market	nurturer,	establishing	and	enforcing	legal,	bankruptcy,	and	regulatory	sys-
tems	in	the	banking	sector.		
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